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Abstract
We analyze games of incomplete information and o¤er equilibrium predictions which are valid for,
and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We
completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payo¤s
and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the rst and second moments of the
equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private
information renes the set of equilibrium predictions.
We consider information sharing among rms under demand uncertainty and nd newly optimal in-
formation policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. Finally, we reverse the perspective and investigate
the identication problem under concerns for robustness to private information. The presence of private
information leads to set rather than point identi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1 Introduction
In games of incomplete information, the private information of each agent typically induces a posterior
belief about the payo¤ states, and a posterior belief about the beliefs of the other agents. The posterior
belief about the payo¤ state represents knowledge about the payo¤ environment, whereas the posterior
belief about the beliefs of the other agents represents knowledge about the belief environment. In turn,
the private information of the agent, the type in the language of Bayesian games, inuences the optimal
strategy of the agent, and ultimately the equilibrium distribution over actions and states. The objective
of this paper is to obtain equilibrium predictions for a given payo¤ environment which are independent of
- and in that sense robust to - the specication of the belief environment.
We dene the payo¤environment as the complete description of the agentspreferences and the common
prior over the payo¤states. The fundamental uncertainty about the set of feasible payo¤s is thus completely
described by the common prior over the payo¤ states, which we also refer to as the fundamental states. We
dene the belief environment as the complete description of the common prior type space over and above
the information contained in the common prior distribution of the payo¤ states. The belief environment
then describes a potentially rich type space which is subject only to the constraint that the marginal
distribution over the fundamental states coincides with the common prior. A pair of payo¤ environment
and belief environment form a standard Bayesian game. Yet importantly, for a given payo¤ environment,
there are many belief environments, and each distinct belief environment may lead to a distinct equilibrium
distribution over outcomes, namely actions and fundamentals.
The objective of the paper is to describe the equilibrium implications of the payo¤ environmentfor
all possible belief environmentsrelative to the given payo¤ environment. Consequently, we refer to the
(partial) characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are independent of the belief environment as
robust predictions. We examine these issues in a tractable class of games with a continuum of players,
symmetric payo¤ functions, and linear best response functions. A possible route towards a comprehen-
sive description of the equilibrium implications stemming from the payo¤ environment alone, would be
an exhaustive analysis of the Bayes Nash equilibria of all possible belief environments associated with a
given payo¤ environment. Here we shall not pursue this direct approach. Instead we shall use a related
equilibrium notion, namely the notion of Bayes correlated equilibrium to obtain a comprehensive charac-
terization. We begin with an epistemic result that establishes the equivalence between the class of Bayes
Nash equilibrium distributions for all possible belief environments and the class of Bayes correlated equi-
librium distributions. This result is a natural extension of a seminal result by Aumann (1987). In games
with complete information about the payo¤ environment, he establishes the equivalence between the set of
Bayes Nash equilibria and the set of correlated equilibria. We present the epistemic result for the class of
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games with a continuum of agent and symmetric payo¤ functions, and show that the insights of Aumann
(1987) generalizes naturally to this class of games with incomplete information.
Subsequently we use the epistemic result to provide a complete characterization of the Bayes correlated
equilibria in the class of games with quadratic payo¤s. With quadratic games, the best response function
of each agent is a linear function and in consequence the conditional expectations of the agents are linked
through linear conditions which in turn permits an explicit construction of the equilibrium sets. The
class of quadratic games has featured prominently in many recent contributions to games of incomplete
information, for example the analysis of rational expectations in competitive markets by Guesnerie (1992),
the analysis of the beauty contest by Morris and Shin (2002) and the equilibrium use of information by
Angeletos and Pavan (2007). We o¤er a characterization of the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the
moments of the equilibrium distributions. In the class of quadratic games, we show that the expected
mean is constant across all equilibria and provide sharp inequalities on the variance-covariance of the joint
outcome state distributions. If the underlying uncertainty about the payo¤ state and the equilibrium
distribution itself are normally distributed then the characterization of the equilibrium is completely given
by the rst and second moments. If the distribution of uncertainty or the equilibrium distribution itself
is not normally distributed, then the characterization of rst and second moments remains valid, but of
course it is not a complete characterization in the sense that the determination of the higher moments is
incomplete.
The relationship between the Bayes Nash equilibrium and the Bayes correlated equilibrium is shown
to lead to new insights into the relationship between information structure and the nature of the Bayes
Nash equilibrium. The compact representation of the Bayes correlated equilibria allows us to assess the
private and social welfare across the entire set of possible information structures and associated Bayes
Nash equilibria. We illustrate this in the context of information sharing among rms. A striking result by
Clarke (1983) was the nding that rms, when facing uncertainty about a common parameter of demand,
will never nd it optimal to share information. The present analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium
allows us to modify this insight - implicitly by allowing for richer information structures than previously
considered - and we nd that the Bayes correlated equilibrium that maximizes the private welfare of the
rms is not necessarily obtained with either zero or full information disclosure.
The initial equivalence result between Bayes correlated and Bayes Nash equilibrium relied on very
weak assumptions about the belief environment of the agents. In particular, we allowed for the possibility
that the agents may have no additional information beyond the common prior about the payo¤ state.
Yet, in some circumstances the agents may be commonly known to have some given prior information, or
background information. Consequently, we then analyze how a lower bound on either the public or the
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private information of the agents, can be used to further rene the robust predictions and impose additional
moment restrictions on the equilibrium distribution.
The payo¤ environment is specied by the (ex-post) observable outcomes, the actions and the payo¤
state. By contrast, the elements of the belief environment, the beliefs of the agents, the beliefs over the
beliefs of the agents, etc. are rarely directly observed or inferred from the revealed choices of the agents.
The absence of the observability (via revealed preference) of the belief environment then constitutes a
separate reason to be skeptical towards an analysis which relies on very specic and detailed assumptions
about the belief environment. Finally, we therefore reverse the perspective of our analysis and consider
the issue of identication rather than prediction. Namely, we are asking whether the observable data,
actions and payo¤ states, can identify the structural parameters of the payo¤ functions, and thus of the
game, without overly narrow assumptions on the belief environment. The question of identication is to
ask whether the observable data imposes restrictions on the unobservable structural parameters of the
game given the equilibrium hypothesis. Similarly to the problem of robust equilibrium prediction, the
question of robust identication then is which restrictions are common to all possible belief environments
given a specic payo¤ environment. We nd that we can robustly identify the sign of some interaction
parameters, but have to leave the sign and size of other parameters, in particular whether the agents are
playing a game of strategic substitutes or complements, unidentied. The identication results here, in
particular the contrast between Bayes Nash equilibrium and Bayes correlated equilibrium, are related to,
but distinct from the results presented in Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008). In their analysis of an entry
game with incomplete information, they document the loss in identication power that arises with a more
permissive solution concept, i.e. level k-rationalizability. As we compare Bayes Nash and Bayes correlated
equilibrium, we show that the lack of identication is not necessarily due to the lack of a common prior,
as associated with rationalizability, but rather the richness of the possible private information structures
(but all with a common prior).
In recent years, the concern for a robust equilibrium analysis in games of incomplete information has
been articulated in many ways. In mechanism design, where the rules of the games can be chosen to have
favorable robustness properties, a number of positive results have been obtained. Dasgupta and Maskin
(2000), Bergemann and Välimäki (2002), Bergemann and Morris (2005), and Perry and Reny (2002) among
others, show that the e¢ cient social allocation can be implemented in an ex-post equilibrium and hence
in Bayes Nash equilibrium for all type spaces, with or without a common prior.1 But in given rather
than designed games, such strong robustness results seem out of reach for most classes of games. In
1Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) demonstrate the limits of these
results by considering multi-dimensional payo¤ types.
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particular, many Bayesian games simply do not have ex post or dominant strategy equilibria. In the absence
of such global robustness results, a natural rst step is then to investigate the robustness of the Bayes Nash
equilibrium to a small perturbation of the information structure. For example, Kajii and Morris (1997)
consider a Nash equilibrium of a complete information game and say that the Nash equilibrium is robust
to incomplete information if every incomplete information game with payo¤s almost always given by the
complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the Nash equilibrium. In
this paper, we take a di¤erent approach and use the dichotomy between the payo¤ environment and the
belief environment to analyze the equilibrium behavior in a given payo¤ environment while allowing for
any arbitrary, but common prior, type space, as long as it is consistent with the given common prior of the
payo¤ type space. Chwe (2006) discusses the role of statistical information in single-agent and multi-agent
decision problems. In a series of related settings, he argues that the correlation between the revealed
choice of an agent, referred to as incentive compatibility, and a random variable, not controlled by the
agent, allows an analyst to infer the nature of the payo¤ interaction between the agents choice and the
random variable. In the current contribution, we trace out the Bayes Nash equilibria associated with
all possible information structures. A related literature seeks to identify the best information structure
consistent with the given common prior over payo¤ types. For example, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007)
characterizes the revenue-maximizing information structure in an auction with many bidders. Similarly,
in a class of sender-receiver games, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) derive the sender-optimal information
structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes the relevant solution concepts
and establishes the epistemic result which relates the set of Bayes Nash equilibria to the set of Bayes
correlated equilibria. Beginning with Section 3, we conne our attention to a class of quadratic games with
normally distributed uncertainty about the payo¤ state. Section 4 reviews the standard approach to games
with incomplete information and analyses the Bayes Nash equilibria under a bivariate belief environment
in which each agent receives a private and a public signal about the payo¤ state. Section 5 begins with
the analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium. We give a complete description of the equilibrium set
in terms of moment restrictions on the joint equilibrium distribution. In Section 6 we analyze how prior
information about the belief environment can further restrict the equilibrium predictions. In Section 7 we
consider the optimal sharing of information among rms. By rephrasing the choice of information policy
as a choice over information structures, we derive newly optimal information policies through the lens of
Bayes correlated equilibria. In Section 8, we turn from prediction to the issue of identication. Section 9
discusses some possible extensions and o¤ers concluding remarks. The Appendix collects the proofs from
the main body of the text.
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2 Set-Up
We rst dene the solution concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium. We then relate the notion of Bayes
correlated equilibrium to robust equilibrium predictions in a class of continuum player games with symmet-
ric payo¤. In the companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2011a), we develop this solution concept and
its relationship to robust predictions in canonical nite player and nite action games. In the companion
paper, we also show how the results there can be adapted and rened rst to symmetric payo¤s and then
to the continuum of agents and continuum of actions analyzed here.
There is a continuum of players and an individual player is indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Each player chooses
an action a 2 R. There will then be a realized population action distribution h 2 (R). There is a payo¤
state  2 . All players have the same payo¤ function u : R(R)! R, where u (a; h; ) is a players
payo¤ if she chooses action a, the population action distribution is h and the state is . There is a prior
distribution  2 (). A payo¤ environment is thus parameterized by (u;  ). We may also refer to (u;  )
as the "basic game" as  2 () only species the common prior distribution over the payo¤ state  2 
whereas it does not specify the private information the agents may have access to.
We will be interested in probability distributions  2 ( (R)) with the interpretation that  is
the joint distribution of the population action distribution h and the state . For any such , we write b
for the induced probability distribution on R  (R)   if (h; ) 2 (R)   are drawn according to
 and there is then a conditionally independent draw of a 2 R according to h. For each a 2 R, we writeb (ja) for the probability on (R) conditional on a (we will write as if it is uniquely dened).
Denition 1 (Bayes Correlated Equilibrium )
A probability distribution  2 ( (R)) is a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) of (u;  ) if
Eb(ja)u (a; h; )  Eb(ja)u  a0; h;  (1)
for each a 2 R and a0 2 R; and
marg =  : (2)
This denition extends the notion of a correlated equilibrium in Aumann (1987) to an environment
with uncertain payo¤s, represented by the state of the world .
We will show that Bayes correlated equilibrium captures all behavior that could arise if players observed
additional private information (in a symmetric way) and played according to a symmetric Bayes Nash
equilibrium. To formalize this, we rst introduce the relevant (symmetric) information structures for this
continuum agent economy. Each player will observe a signal (or realize a type) t 2 T . In each state of the
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world  2 , there will be a realized distribution of signals g 2 (T ) drawn according to a distribution
k 2 ( (T )). Let  :  ! ( (T )) give the distribution over signal distributions. Thus the belief
environment, or alternatively an information structure, is parameterized by (T; ).
The payo¤ environment (u;  ) and the belief environment (T; ) together dene a game of incomplete
information ((u;  ) ; (T; )). A symmetric strategy in the game is then dened by  : T ! (R). The
interpretation is that  (t) is the realized distribution of actions among those players observing signal t
(i.e., we are "assuming the law of large numbers" on the continuum). A distribution of signals g 2 (T )
and  2  induce a probability distribution g   2 (R). The prior  2 () and signal distribution
 :  ! (T ) induce a probability distribution    2 ( (T )). As before, write [   for the
probability distribution on T (T ) if (g; ) 2 (T ) are drawn according to    and there is
then a conditionally independent draw of t 2 T according to the realized g 2 (T ). For each t 2 T , we
write [   (jt) for the probability on (T ) conditional on t (we will write as if it is uniquely dened).
Denition 2 (Bayes Nash Equilibrium)
A strategy  2  is a Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) of ((u;  ) ; (T; )) if
E[ (jt)u (a; g  ; )  E[ (jt)u
 
a0; g  ; 

;
for all t 2 T , a in the support of  ( jt) and a0 2 R.
Let      be the probability distribution on ( (R)) induced if (g; ) 2 (T ) are drawn
according to    and h 2 (R) is set equal to g  .
Denition 3 (Bayes Nash Equilibrium Distribution)
A probability distribution  2 ( (R)) is a BNE action state distribution of ((u;  ) ; (T; )) if there
exists a BNE  of ((u;  ) ; (T; )) such that  =     .
We are now in a position to relate the Bayes correlated equilibria with the Bayes Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1
A probability distribution  2 ( (R)) is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of (u;  ) if and only if it is
a BNE action state distribution ((u;  ) ; (T; )) for some information structure (T; ).
Aumann (1987) establishes the relation between Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria in games with
complete information. In the companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2011a), we establish the relevant
epistemic results for canonical game theoretic environments in more detail.
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In our companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2011a), the notion of Bayes correlated equilibrium is
dened in a canonical game theory environment - with a nite number of actions, agents and states - where
the players have additional information from an information structure (T; ), and thus a Bayes correlated
equilibrium is a joint distribution over action, states and types, i.e. a distribution  2 (A T ).
In the language of the more general notion o¤ered there, the Bayes correlated equilibrium dened here is
the Bayes correlated information with the null information structure, i.e. the case in which the agents
are not assumed a priori to have access to a specic information structure . Here, we choose this minimal
notion of a Bayes correlated equilibrium to obtain robust predictions for an observer who only knows the
payo¤ environment but has null information about the belief environment of the game. But, just as in
the companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2011a), we can analyze the impact of private information
on the size of the Bayes correlated equilibrium set. In fact in Section 6, we analyze how prior knowledge
of the belief environment can rene the set of equilibrium predictions. We maintain our restriction to
normally distributed uncertainty, now normally distributed types, to obtain explicit descriptions of the
resulting restriction on the equilibrium set. By contrast, in Bergemann and Morris (2011a), we allow for
general information structures and derive a many player generalization of the ordering of Blackwell (1953)
as a necessary and su¢ cient condition to order the set of Bayes correlated equilibrium. However, within
this general environment, we do not obtain an explicit and compact description of the equilibrium set in
terms of the rst and second moments of the equilibrium distributions, as we do in the present analysis.
The general notion of Bayes correlated information also facilitates the discussion of the relationships
between the notion of Bayes correlated equilibrium, and related, but distinct notions of correlated equilib-
rium in games of incomplete information, most notably in the work of Forges (1993), which is titled and
identies ve legitimate denitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information. We
refer to the reader to the companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2011a) for a detailed discussion and
comparison.
3 Linear Best Response and Normal Uncertainty
For the remainder of this paper, we shall consider a payo¤ environment with linear best responses and
normally distributed uncertainty. Thus we assume that player i sets his action equal to a linear function
of his expectations of the average action of others A and a payo¤ relevant state . Thus we have
ai = rEi (A) + sEi () + u, (3)
where r; s; u 2 R are the parameters of the best response function and are assumed to be identical across
players. The average action of the all players but i is represented by A. In the case of a nite number I of
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With the linear best response, the equilibrium behavior with a nite, but large number of players converges
to the equilibrium behavior with a continuum of players. The model with a continuum of players has the
advantage that we do not need to keep track of the relative weight of the individual player i, namely 1=I,
and the weight of all the other players, namely (I   1) =I. In consequence, the expression of the equilibrium
strategies are frequently more compact with a continuum of players. In the subsequent analysis, we will
focus on the game with a continuum of players, but report on the necessary adjustments with a nite
player environment.
The parameter r represents the strategic interaction among the players, and we therefore refer to it
as the interaction parameter. If r < 0, then we have a game of strategic substitutes, if r > 0, then
we have a game of strategic complementarities. The case of r = 0 represents the case of single person
decision problem where each player i simply responds the state of the world , but is not concerned about
his interaction with the other players.
The parameter s represents the informational response of player i, and it can be either negative or
positive. We shall assume that the state of the world  matters for the decision of agent i, and hence s 6= 0.
We shall assume that the interaction parameter r is bounded above, or
r 2 ( 1; 1) ; (6)
which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the complete information game to have an interior Nash
equilibrium. In fact, with the restriction (6), the Nash equilibrium in the game with complete information





1  r, for all i and . (7)
Moreover, under complete information about the state of the world , even the correlated equilibrium is
unique; Neyman (1997) gives an elegant argument.








The present environment of linear best response and normally distributed uncertainty encompasses a
wide class of interesting economic environments. The following three applications are prominent examples
and we shall return to them throughout the paper to illustrate some of the results.
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Example 1 (Beauty Contest) In Morris and Shin (2002), a continuum of agents, i 2 [0; 1], have to
choose an action under incomplete information about the state of the world . Each agent i has a payo¤
function given by:
ui (ai; A; ) =   (1  r) (ai   )2   r (ai  A)2 .
The weight r reects concern for the average action A taken in the population. Morris and Shin (2002)
analyze the Bayes Nash equilibrium in which each agent i has access to a private (idiosyncratic) signal and
a public (common) signal of the world. In terms of our notation, the beauty contest model set s = 1   r
and u = 0 with 0  r < 1.
Example 2 (Competitive and Strategic Markets) Guesnerie (1992) presents an analysis of the
stability of the competitive equilibrium by considering a continuum of producers with a quadratic cost of
production and a linear inverse demand function. If there is uncertainty about the demand intercept, we
can write the demand curve as p (A) = s + rA + u with r < 0 while the cost of rm i is c (ai) = 12a
2
i .
Individual rm prots are now given by




In an alternative interpretation, we can have a common cost shock, so the demand curve is p (A) = rA+u
with r < 0 while the cost of rm i is c (ai) =  sai + 12a
2
i . Such an economy can be derived as the limit
of large, but nite, Cournot markets, as shown by Vives (1988), (2011).
Example 3 (Quadratic Economies and the Social Value of Information) Angeletos and Pavan
(2009) consider a general class of quadratic economies (games) with a continuum of agents and private
information about a common state  2 R. There the payo¤ of agent i is given by a symmetric quadratic
utility function ui (ai; A; ), which depends on the individual action ai, the average action A and the payo¤
state  2 R:


















where the matrix U = fUklg represents the payo¤ structure of the game. In the earlier working paper
version, Bergemann and Morris (2011b), we also represented the payo¤ structure of the game by the matrix
U . Angeletos and Pavan (2009) assume that the payo¤s are concave in the own action: Uaa < 0; and that
the interaction of the individual action and the average action (the indirect e¤ect) is bounded by the
own action (the direct e¤ect):
 UaA=Uaa < 1, Uaa + UaA < 0. (10)
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The quadratic term of the own cost, Uaa simply normalizes the terms of the strategic and informational
externality, UaA and Ua. In terms of the present notation we have
r =  UaA
Uaa
; s =  Ua
Uaa
.
Their restriction (10) is equivalent to the present restriction (6). The entries in the payo¤ matrix U which
do not refer to the individual action a, i.e. the entries in the lower submatrix of U , namely24 UAA UA
UA U
35
are not relevant for the determination of either the Bayes Nash or the Bayes correlated equilibrium. These
entries may be relevant for welfare analysis (as in Angeletos and Pavan (2009)), but for the welfare analysis
in this paper they are not and can be uniformly set to zero.
4 Bayes Nash Equilibrium
We rst report as a benchmark a standard approach to analyzing this class of games of incomplete infor-
mation. Starting with the payo¤ environment described in the previous section, we add a description of the
belief environment, i.e., what players know about the state and othersbeliefs. Specically, we assume that
each player observes a two-dimensional signal. In the rst dimension, the signal is privately observed and
idiosyncratic to the agent, whereas in the second dimension, the signal is publicly observed and common to
all the agents. In either dimension, the signal is normally distributed and centered around the true state
of the world . In this class of normally distributed signals, a specic type space is determined by the
variance of the noise along each dimension of the signal. For given variances, and hence for a given type
space, we then analyze the Bayes Nash equilibrium/a of the basic game. We shall then proceed to analyze
the basic game with the notion of Bayes correlated equilibrium and establish which predictions are robust
across all of the private information environments, independent of the specic bivariate and normal type
space to be considered now.
Accordingly, we consider the following bivariate normal information structure. Each agent i is observing
a private and a public noisy signal of the true state of the world . The private signal xi, observed only
by agent i, is dened by:
xi =  + "i; (11)
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and the public signal, common and commonly observed by all the agents is dened by:
y =  + ". (12)
The random variables "i and " are normally distributed with zero mean and variance given by 2x and 
2
y,
respectively; moreover "i and " are independently distributed, with respect to each other and the state .
This model of bivariate normally distributed signals appears frequently in games of incomplete information,
see Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) among many others. It is at times convenient
to express the variance of the random variables in terms of the precision:







we refer to the vector (x; y) as the information structure of the game.
A special case of the noisy environment is the environment with zero noise. In this environment, the
complete information environment, each agent observes the state of the world  without noise. We begin
the equilibrium analysis with the complete information environment. The best response:
ai = rA+ s + u,
reects the, possibly conicting, objectives that agent i faces. Each agent has to solve a prediction-like
problem in which he wishes to match his action, with the state  and the average action A simultaneously.
The interaction parameters, s and r, determine the weight that each component,  and A, receives in
the deliberation of the agent. If there is zero strategic interaction, or r = 0, then each agent faces a pure
prediction problem. Now, we observed earlier, see (7), that the resulting Nash equilibrium strategy is given
by:




We refer to the terms in equilibrium strategy (13), u= (1  r) and s= (1  r), as the equilibrium intercept
and the equilibrium slope, respectively.
Next, we analyze the game with incomplete information, where each agent receives a bivariate noisy
signal (xi; y). In particular, we shall compare how responsive the strategy of each agent is to the underlying
state of the world relative to the responsiveness in the game with complete information. In the game with
incomplete information, agent i receives a pair of signals, xi and y, generated by the information structure
(11) and (12). The prediction problem now becomes more di¢ cult for the agent. First, he does not observe
the state , but rather he receives some noisy signals, xi and y, of . Second, since he does not observe
the other agentssignals either, he can only form an expectation about their actions, but again has to rely
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on the signals xi and y to form the conditional expectation. The best response function of agent i then
requires that action a is justied by the conditional expectation, given xi and y:
ai = rE [A jxi; y ] + sE [ jxi; y ] + u.
In this linear quadratic environment with normal distributions, we conjecture that the equilibrium strategy
is given by a function linear in the signals xi and y: a (xi; y) = 0 + xxi + yy. The equilibrium is then
identied by the linear coe¢ cients 0; x; y; which we expect to depend on the interaction terms (r; s; u)
and the information structure (x; y).
Proposition 2 (Linear Bayes Nash Equilibrium)






















The derivation of the linear equilibrium strategy already appeared in many contexts, e.g., in Morris
and Shin (2002) for the beauty contest model, and for the present general environment, in Angeletos and
Pavan (2007). With the normalization of the average action given by (4) and (5), the above equilibrium
strategy is independent of the number of players, and in particular independent of the nite or continuum
version of the environment.
The Bayes Nash equilibrium shares the uniqueness property with the Nash equilibrium, its complete
information counterpart. We observe that the linear coe¢ cients x and 









1  r . (15)
Thus, if there is no strategic interaction, or r = 0, then the signals xi and y receive weights proportional
to the precision of the signals. The fact that xi is a private signal and y is a public signal does not matter
in the absence of strategic interaction, all that matters is the ability of the signal to predict the state
of the world. By contrast, if there is strategic interaction, r 6= 0, then the relative weights also reect
the informativeness of the signal with respect to the average action. Thus if the game displays strategic
complements, r > 0, then the public signal y receives a larger weight. The commonality of the public signal
across agents means that their decision is responding to the public signal at the same rate, and hence in
equilibrium the public signal is more informative about the average action than the private signal. By
contrast, if the game displays strategic substitutability, r < 0, then each agent would like to move away
from the average, and hence places a smaller weight on the public signal y, even though it still contains
information about the underlying state of the world.
13
Now, if we compare the equilibrium strategies under complete and incomplete information, (13) and
(14), we nd that in the incomplete information environment, each agent still responds to the state of the
world , but his response to  is noisy as both xi and y are noisy realizations of , but centered around :
xi =  + "i and y =  + ". Now, given that the best response, and hence the equilibrium strategy, of each
agent is linear in the expectation of , the variation in the action is explainedby the variation in the
true state, or more generally in the expectation of the true state.
Proposition 3 (Attenuation)
The mean action in equilibrium is:
E [a] = 0 + x + y =
u+ s
1  r ;
and the sum of the weights, x + 

y, is:x + y =  s1  r





Thus, the mean of the individual action, E [a], is independent of the information structure (x; y). In
addition, we nd that the linear coe¢ cients of the equilibrium strategy under incomplete information are
(weakly) less responsive to the true state  than under complete information. In particular, the sum of
the weights is strictly increasing in the precision of the noisy signals xi and y. The equilibrium response
to the state of the world  is diluted by the noisy signals, that is the response is attenuated. The residual
is always picked up by the intercept of the equilibrium response.
Now, if we ask how the joint distribution of the Bayes Nash equilibrium varies with the information
structure, then Proposition 3 established that it is su¢ cient to consider the higher moments of the equi-
librium distribution. But given the normality of the equilibrium distribution, it follows that it is su¢ cient
to consider the second moments, that is the variance-covariance matrix. The variance-covariance matrix















We denote the correlation coe¢ cient between action ai and aj shorthand by a rather than aa.
With a continuum of agents, we can describe the equilibrium distribution, after replacing the individual
action aj by the average action A, through the triple (ai; A; ). The covariance between the individual, but
symmetrically distributed, actions ai and aj , given by a
2
a has to be equal to the variance of the average
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action, or 2A = a
2
a.
2 Similarly, the covariance between the individual action and the average action
has to be equal to the covariance of any two, symmetric, individual action proles, or aAaA = a
2
a.
Likewise, the covariance between the individual (but symmetric) action ai and the state  has to equal to
the covariance between the average action and the state , or or aa = AA.
With the characterization of the unique Bayes Nash equilibrium in Proposition 2, we can express the
variance-covariance matrix of the equilibrium joint distribution over (ai; A; ) in terms of the equilibrium
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Conversely, given the structure of the variance-covariance matrix, we can express the equilibrium coe¢ cients
x and 









a   2a. (18)
Thus, we attribute to the private signal x, through the weight x, the residual correlation between a
and , where the residual is obtained by removing the correlation between a and  which is due to the
public signal. In turn, the weight attributed to the public signal is proportional to the di¤erence between
the correlation across actions and across action and signal. We recall that the actions of any two agents
are correlated as they respond to the same underlying fundamental state . Thus, even if their private
signals are independent conditional on the true state of the world , their actions are correlated due to
the correlation with the hidden random variable . Now, if these conditionally independent signals were
the only sources of information, and the correlation between action and the hidden state  where a,
then all the correlation of the agentsaction would have to come through the correlation with the hidden
state, and in consequence the correlation across actions arises indirectly, in a two way passage through the
hidden state, or a = a  a. In consequence, any correlation a beyond this indirect path, or a   2a is
generated by means of a common signal, the public signal y.
Since the correlation coe¢ cient of the actions has to be nonnegative, the above representation suggest
that as long as the correlation coe¢ cient (a; a) satisfy:
0  a  1, and a   2a  0; (19)
2With a nite number of agents and the denition of the average action given by: A = (1= (I   1))
P
j 6=i aj , the variance







2a and hence the variance-covariance matrix in the continuum version is only an
approximation, but not exact. We present the exact restrictions in Corollary 1 in the next section.
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we can nd information structures (x; y) such the coe¢ cients resulting from (18) are indeed the equilib-
rium coe¢ cients of the associated Bayes Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 4 (Information and Correlation)
For every (a; a) such that 0  a  1, and a   2a  0; there exists a unique information structure
(x; y) such that the associated Bayes Nash equilibrium displays the correlation coe¢ cients (a; a):
x =
(1  a) 2a 

























, the set of possible Bayes Nash
equilibria is described by the area below the 45 degree line. We illustrate how a particular Bayes Nash equi-
librium with its correlation structure (a; a) is generated by a particular information structure (x; y). In
Figure 1, each level curve describes the correlation structure of the Bayes Nash equilibrium for a particular
precision x of the private signal. A higher precision x generates a higher level curve. The upward sloping
movement represents an increase in informativeness of the public signal, i.e. an increase in the precision
y. An increase in the precision of the public signal therefore leads to an increase in the correlation of
action across agents as well as in the correlation between individual action and state of the world. For low
levels of precision in the private and the public signal, an increase in the precision of the public signal rst
leads to an increase in the correlation of actions, and then only later into an increased correlation with the
state of the world.






. But this time, each
level curve is identied by the precision y of the public signal. As the precision of the private signal
increases, the level curve bends upward and rst backward, and eventually forward. At low levels of the
precision of the private signal, an increase in the precision of the private signal increases the dispersion across
agents and hence decreases the correlation across agents. But as it gives each individual more information
about the true state of the world, an increase in precision always leads to an increase in the correlation
with the true state of the world, this is the upward movement. As the precision improves, eventually the
noise becomes su¢ ciently small so that the underlying common value generated by  dominates the noise,
and then serves to both increase the correlation with the state and across actions. But in contrast to
the private information, where the equilibrium sets moves mostly northwards, i.e. where the improvement
occurs mostly in the direction of an increase in the correlation between the state and the individual agent,

















Figure 1: Bayes Nash equilibrium of beauty contest, r = 1=4, with varying degree of precision x of private
signal.
an increase in the correlation across actions. In fact for a given correlation between the individual actions,
represented by a, an increase in the precision of the public signal leads to the elimination of Bayes Nash
equilibria with very low and with very high correlation between the state of the world and the individual
action.
5 Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
We now characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We restrict attention to symmetric and normally
distributed correlated equilibria and discuss the extent to which these are without loss of generality at the
end of this Section. We begin the analysis with a continuum of agents and subsequently describe how the
equilibrium restrictions are modied in a nite player environment.
We can characterize the Bayes correlated equilibria in two distinct, yet related, ways. With a continuum
of agents, we can characterize the equilibria in terms of the realized average action A and the deviation of
the individual action ai from the average action, ai A. Under the continuum hypothesis, the distribution
around the realized average action A represents the exact distribution of actions by the agents, conditional
on the realized average action A. Alternatively we can characterize the equilibria in terms of an arbitrary
pair of individual actions, ai and aj , and the state of the world . The rst approach puts more emphasis on
the distributional properties of the correlated equilibrium, and is convenient when we go beyond symmetric
and normally distributed equilibria, whereas the second approach is closer to the description of the Bayes

















Figure 2: Bayes Nash equilibrium of beauty contest, r = 1=4, with varying degree of precision x of public
signal.
5.1 Equilibrium Moment Restrictions
We consider the class of symmetric and normally distributed Bayes correlated equilibria. With the hy-
pothesis of a normally distributed Bayes correlated equilibrium, the aggregate distribution of the state of











In the continuum economy, we can describe the individual action a as centered around the average action




. In consequence, the joint equilibrium



























The analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium proceeds by deriving restrictions on the joint equilibrium
distribution (20). In other words, we seeks to identify the restrictions on the moments of the equilibrium
distribution. Given that we presently restrict attention to a multivariate normal distribution, it is su¢ cient
to derive restrictions in terms of the rst and second moments of the equilibrium distribution (20). The
equilibrium restrictions arise from two sources: (i) the best response conditions of the individual agents:
ai = rE [A jai ] + sE [ jai ] + u, for all i and ai 2 R, (21)
and (ii) the consistency condition, see Denition 1, where the later condition, namely that the marginal
distribution over  is equal to the common prior over , is satised by construction of the joint equilibrium
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distribution (20). The best response condition (21) of the Bayes correlated equilibrium allows the agent
to form his expectation over the average action A and the state of the world  by conditioning on the
information that is contained in his recommendedequilibrium action ai.
As the best response condition (21) uses the expectation of the individual agent, it is convenient to
introduce the following change of variable for the equilibrium random variable. By hypothesis of the
symmetric equilibrium, we have:







The covariance between the individual action and the average action is given by aAaA = 
2
A;and is


















In consequence, we can rewrite the joint equilibrium distribution of (;A; a) in terms of the moments

























With the joint equilibrium distribution described by (25), we now use the best response property (21),
to completely characterize the moments of the equilibrium distribution. Note that this corresponds to
imposing the obedience condition (1) in the general setting of Section 2.
As the best response property (21) has to hold for all ai in the support of the correlated equilibrium, it
follows that the above condition has to hold in expectation over all ai, or by the law of total expectation:
E [ai] = u+ sE [E [ jai ]] + rE [E [A jai ]] . (26)
But by symmetry, it follows that the expected action of each agent is equal to expected average action A,
and hence we can use (26) to solve for the mean of the individual action and the average action:




1  r . (27)
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It thus follows that the mean of the individual action and the mean of the average action is uniquely
determined by the mean value  of the state of the world and parameters (r; s; u) across all correlated
equilibria.
The complete description of the set of correlated equilibria then rests on the description of the second
moments of the multivariate distribution. The characterization of the second moments of the equilibrium
distribution again uses the best response property of the individual action, see (21). But, now we use
the property of the conditional expectation, rather than the iterated expectation to derive restrictions on
the covariates. The recommended action ai has to constitute a best response in the entire support of the
equilibrium distribution. Hence the best response has to hold for all ai 2 R, and thus the conditional
expectation of the state E [ jai ] and of the average action, E [A jai ], have to change with ai at exactly the




dE [ jai ]
dai
+ r
dE [A jai ]
dai

; for all ai 2 R.
Given the multivariate normal distribution (25), the conditional expectations E [ jai ] and E [A jai ] are




















1  r (1  a) + aai: (29)





It follows that we can express either one of the three elements in the description of the second moments,
(a; a; a) in terms of the other two and the primitives of the game as described by (r; s). In fact, it is





The remaining restrictions on the correlation coe¢ cients a and a are coming in the form of inequalities






= 2Aa  a. (31)
Finally, the standard deviation has to be positive, or a  0. Now, it follows from the assumption of
moderate interaction, r < 1, and the nonnegativity restriction of a implied by (31) that 1  ar > 0, and
thus to guarantee that a  0, it has to be that sa  0. Thus the sign of the correlation coe¢ cient a











Figure 3: Set of Bayes correlated equilibrium in terms of correlation coe¢ cients a and jaj
Proposition 5 (First and Second Moments of BCE)
A multivariate normal distribution of (ai; A; ) is a symmetric Bayes correlated equilibrium if and only if
1. the mean of the individual action is:
E [ai] =
u
1  r + 
s
1  r ; (32)





3. the correlation coe¢ cients a and a satisfy the inequalities:
2a  a and s  a  0. (34)
The characterization of the rst and second moments suggests that the mean  and the variance 
2
 of
the fundamental variable  are the driving force of the moments of the equilibrium actions. The linear form
of the best response function translates into a linear relationship in the rst and second moment of the
state of the world and the equilibrium action. In the case of the standard deviation, the linear relationship
is a¤ected by the correlation coe¢ cients a and a which assign weights to the interaction parameter r
and s, respectively. The set of all correlated equilibria is graphically represented in Figure 3.
The restriction on the correlation coe¢ cients, namely 2a  a, emerged directly from the above change
of variable, see (22)-(24). Alternatively, but equivalently, we could have disregarded the restrictions implied
by the change of variables, and simply insisted that the matrix of second moments of (25) is indeed a
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legitimate variance-covariance matrix, i.e. that is a nonnegative denite matrix. A necessary and su¢ cient








 0 ) 2a  a.
Later, we extend the analysis from the pure common value environment analyzed here, to an inter-
dependent value environment (in Section 5.5) and to prior private information (in Section 6). In these
extensions, it will be convenient to extract the equilibrium restrictions in form of the correlation inequal-
ities, directly from the restriction of the nonnegative denite matrix, rather than trace them through the
relevant change of variable. In any case, these two procedures establish the same equilibrium restrictions.
We observe that at a = 0, the only correlated equilibrium is given by a = 1, in other words, there is
a discontinuity in the equilibrium set at a = 0. In the symmetric equilibrium, if a = 0, then this means
that the action of each agent is completely insensitive to the realization of the true state . But this means,
that the agents do not respond to any information about the state of the world  beyond the expected
value of the state, E []. Thus, each agent acts as if he were in a complete information world where the
true state of the world is the expected value of the state. But, we know from the earlier discussion, that
in this environment, there is a unique correlated equilibrium where the agents all choose the same action
and hence a = 1.
At this point, it is appropriate to describe how the analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium would
be modied by the presence of a nite number I of agents. We remarked in Section 3 that the best response
function of the agent i is constant in the number of players. As the best response is independent of the
number of players, it follows that the equilibrium equality restrictions, namely (32) and (33), are una¤ected
by the number, in particular the niteness, of the players. The only modication arises with the change
of variable, see (22)-(24), which relied on the continuum of agents. By contrast, the inequality restrictions
with a nite number of players can be recovered directly from the fact that variance-covariance matrix
a1;:::;aI ; of the equilibrium random variables (a1; :::; aI ; ) has to be a nonnegative denite matrix.
Corollary 1 (First and Second Moments of BCE with Finitely Many Players)
A multivariate normal distribution of (a1; :::; aI ; ) is a symmetric Bayes correlated equilibrium if and only
if it satises (32), (33), and the correlation coe¢ cients a and a satisfy the inequalities:
a   
1




I   1 ; s  a  0. (35)
It is immediate to verify that the restrictions of the correlation structure in (35) converge towards the
one in (34) as I !1. We observe that the restrictions in (35) are more permissive with a smaller number
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of agents, and in particular allow for moderate negative correlation across individual actions with a nite
number of agents. By contrast, with innitely many agents, it is a statistical impossibility that all actions
are mutually negatively correlated.
The condition on the variance of the individual action, given by (30), actually follows the same logic as
the condition on the mean of the individual action, given by (27). To wit, for the mean, we used the law of
total expectation to arrive at the equality restriction. Similarly, we could obtain the above restriction (30)
by using the law of total variance and covariance. More precisely, we could require, using the equality (21),
that the variance of the individual action matches the sum of the variances of the conditional expectations.
Then, by using the law of total variance and covariance, we could represent the variance of the conditional
expectation in terms of the variance of the original random variables, and obtain the exact same condition
(30). Here we chose to directly use the linear form of the conditional expectation given by the multivariate
normal distribution. We explain towards the end of the section that the later method, which restricts the
moments via conditioning, remains valid beyond the multivariate normal distributions.
5.2 Volatility and Dispersion
Proposition 5 documents that the relationship between the correlation coe¢ cients a and a depends only
on the sign of the information externality s, but not on the strength of the parameters r and s. We can
therefore focus our attention on the variance of the individual action and how it varies with the strength
of the interaction as measured by the correlation coe¢ cients (a; a).
Proposition 6 (Variance of Individual Action)
1. If the game displays strategic complements, r > 0; then: (i) a is increasing in a and jaj; (ii) the
maximal a is obtained at a = jaj = 1:
2. If the game displays strategic substitutes, r < 0, then: (i) a is decreasing in a and increasing in
jaj; (ii) the maximal a is obtained at







In particular, we nd that as the correlation in the actions across individuals increases, the variance
in the action is amplied in the case of strategic complements, but attenuated in the case of strategic
substitutes. An interesting implication of the attenuation of the individual variance is that the maximal
variance of the individual action may not be attained under minimal or maximal correlation of the individual
actions but rather at an intermediate level of interaction. In particular, if the interaction e¤ect r is large,
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namely jrj > 1, then the maximal variance a is obtained with an interior solution. Of course, in the case
of strategic complements, the positive feed-back e¤ect implies that the maximal variance is obtained when
the actions are maximally correlated.
So far we have described the Bayes correlated equilibrium in terms of the triple (;A; a). Yet, a distinct
but equivalent representation can be given in terms of (;A; a A) : the state , the average action A,
the idiosyncratic di¤erence, a A. In games with a continuum of agents, we can interpret the conditional
distribution of the agents action a around the mean A as the exact distribution of the actions in the
population. The idiosyncratic di¤erence a A describes the dispersion around the average action, and the
variance of the average action A can be interpreted as the volatility of the game. The dispersion, a   A,
measures how much the individual action can deviate from the average action, yet be justied consistently
with the conditional expectation of each agent in equilibrium. The language for volatility and dispersion
in the context of this environment was earlier suggested by Angeletos and Pavan (2007). The dispersion is
described by the variance of a  A, which is given by (1  a)2a whereas the aggregate volatility is given
by 2A = a
2
a.
Proposition 7 (Volatility and Dispersion)
1. The volatility is increasing in jaj, and increasing in a if and only if r   1=a;






The dispersion, a  A, measures how much the individual action can deviate from the average action.
The maximal level of dispersion occurs when the correlation with respect to the state  is largest. But
it reaches its maximum at an interior level of the correlation across the individual actions as we might
expect. We note that relative to the variance of the individual action, see Proposition 6, the volatility, is
increasing in the correlation coe¢ cient a for a larger range of strategic interaction parameters, including
moderate strategic substitutes.
5.3 Matching Bayes Correlated and Nash Equilibria
The description of the Bayes correlated equilibria lead to a complete characterization of the equilibrium
behavior of the agents. Yet, the construction of the equilibrium set did not give us any direct information
as to how rich and complicated an information structure would have to be to support the behavior in
terms of a related Bayes Nash equilibrium. We know from the epistemic result of Proposition 1 that such
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information structures exists, but we do not yet know which form they may take. We now describe the
relationship between Bayes correlated and Bayes Nash equilibria by constructing the information structure
implicitly associated with every Bayes correlated equilibrium. We are going to describe a class of bivariate
information structures, such that the union of the Bayes Nash equilibria generated by these information
structures spans the entire set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
We observe that the Bayes Nash and correlated equilibria share the same mean. We can therefore
match the respective equilibria if we can match the second moments of the equilibria. After inserting
the coe¢ cients of the linear strategies of the Bayes Nash equilibrium, we can match the moments of the
two equilibrium notions. In the process, we get two equations relating the Bayes correlated and Nash
equilibrium. The Bayes Nash equilibria are dened by the variance of the private and the public signal.
The correlated equilibria are dened by the correlation coe¢ cients of individual actions across agents, and
individual actions and state .
Corollary 2 (Matching BCE and BNE)
For every interaction structure (r; s; u), there is a bijection between Bayes correlated and Bayes Nash
equilibrium.
Finally we observe that for a given nite precision of the information structure, i.e. 0 < (x; y) <1,
the associated Bayes Nash equilibrium is an interior point relative to the set of correlated equilibria. As
the set of correlated equilibria is described by a   2a  0, and since we know that a = (aA)
2 we have
aA > jaj. It follows that the Bayes Nash equilibrium is an interior equilibrium relative to the correlated
equilibria in terms of the correlation coe¢ cients, and certainly in terms of the variance of individual and
average action. To put it di¤erently, the equality a = 
2
a is obtained in the Bayes Nash equilibrium if
and only if the precision of the public signal satises y = 0.
The above description of the bijection between Bayes correlated and Bayes Nash equilibrium was stated
for the class of normally distributed Bayes Nash equilibria. An interesting aspect of the constructive
approach was that a bivariate information structure was su¢ cient to generate the entire set of Bayes
correlated equilibria. We conjecture that the su¢ ciency of a bivariate information structures is likely to
remain valid even with general distribution of fundamental uncertainty. After all, the correlation coe¢ cients
arise from idiosyncratic dispersion and aggregate volatility. The private signal supports the idiosyncratic
dispersion and the public signal is su¢ cient to support the aggregate volatility.
5.4 Interdependent Value Environment
So far, we have restricted our analysis to the common value environment in which the state of the world is
the same for every agent. However, the analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium set easily extends to
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a model with interdependent, but not necessarily common values. We describe a suitable generalization of
the common value environment to an interdependent value environment: the payo¤ type of agent i is now
given by i = + i, where  is the common value component and i is the private value component. The






, and the distribution of the




. It follows that by increasing 2 at the expense of 
2
, we
can move from a model of pure common values to a model of pure private values, and in between are in a
canonical model of interdependent values.
The analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium can proceed as in Section 5.1. The earlier representa-
tion of the Bayes correlated equilibrium in terms of the variance-covariance matrix of the individual action
a, the aggregate action A and the common value  simply has to be augmented by distinguishing between


















The new correlation coe¢ cient a represents the correlation between the individual action a and the
individual value, the private component . The set of the Bayes correlated equilibria are a¤ected by the
introduction of the private component in a systematic manner. The equilibrium conditions, in terms of
the best response, are given by:
a = rE [A ja ] + sE [ +  ja ] + u. (37)
As the private component  has zero mean, it is centered around the common value , the private component
does not change the mean action in equilibrium. However, the addition of the private value component does
a¤ect the variance and covariance of the Bayes correlated equilibria. In fact, the best response condition
(37), restricts the variance of the individual action to:
a =
s (a + a)
1  ar
;
so that the standard deviation a of the individual action is now composed of the weighted sum of the
common and private value sources of payo¤ uncertainty. Finally, the additional restrictions that arise from
the requirement that the matrix a;A;; is indeed a variance-covariance matrix, i.e. that it is a positive
denite matrix, simply appear integrated in the original conditions:
a   2a  0; 1  2a   a  0. (38)
In other words, to the extent that the individual action is correlated with the private component, it imposes
a bound on how much the individual actions can be correlated, or a  1   2a . Thus to the extent that
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the individual agents action is correlated with the private component, it also limits the extent to which
the individual action can be related with the public component, as by construction, the private and the
public component are independently distributed. In Section 6, we consider the role of prior information
on the structure of the equilibrium set, and a natural case of prior information is that each agent knows
his own payo¤ type i =  + i, but does not necessarily know the composition of his own payo¤ state in
terms of the private and public component.
5.5 Beyond Normal Distributions and Symmetry
Beyond Normal Distributions The above characterization of the mean and variance of the equilib-
rium distribution was obtained under the assumption that the distributions of the fundamental variable
 and resulting joint distribution was a multivariate normal distribution. Now, even if the distribution of
the state of the world  is a normally distributed, the joint equilibrium distribution does not necessarily
have to be a normal distribution itself. If the equilibrium distribution is not a multivariate normal distri-
bution anymore, then the rst and second moments alone do not completely characterize the equilibrium
distribution anymore. In other words, the rst and second moment only impose restrictions on the higher
moments, but do not completely identify the higher moments anymore. We observe however that the
restrictions regarding the rst and second moment remain to hold. In particular, the result regarding the
mean of the action is independent of the distribution of the equilibrium or even the normality of the funda-
mental variable . With respect to the restrictions on the second moments, the restrictions still hold, but
outside of the class of multivariate normal distribution, the inequalities may not necessarily be achieved as
equalities for some equilibrium distributions.
In this context, it is worthwhile to note that the equilibrium characterization of the rst and second
moments could alternatively be obtained by using the law of total expectation, and its second moment
equivalents, the law of total variance and covariance. These laws, insofar as they relate marginal prob-
abilities to conditional probabilities, naturally appeared in the equilibrium characterization of the best
response function which introduce the conditional expectation over the state and the average action, and
hence the conditional probabilities. For higher-order moments, an elegant generalization of this relationship
exists, see Brillinger (1969), sometimes referred to as law of total cumulance, and as such would deliver
further restrictions on higher-order moments if we were to consider equilibrium distributions beyond the
normal distribution.
Beyond Symmetry The above characterization of the mean and variance of the equilibrium distribution
pertained to the symmetric equilibrium distribution. But actually, the characterization remains entirely
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valid for all equilibrium distributions if we focus on the average action rather than the individual action. In
addition, the result about the mean of the individual action remains true for all equilibrium distributions,
and not only the symmetric equilibrium distribution. This later result suggests that the asymmetric
equilibria only o¤er a richer set of possible second moments distributions across agents. Interestingly, in
the nite agent environment, the asymmetry in the second moments does not lead to joint distributions over
aggregates outcomes and state which cannot be obtain already with symmetric equilibrium distributions.
6 Prior Information
The description of the Bayes correlated equilibria displayed a rich set of possible equilibrium outcomes.
In particular, the variance of the individual and the average action had a wide range across equilibria.
The analysis of the Bayes Nash equilibrium shed light on the source of the variation. If the noisy signals
of each agent contained little information about the state of the world, then the action of each agent did
not vary much in the realization of the signal. On the other hand, with precise information about the
true state of the world, the best response of each agent would vary substantially with the realized signal
and hence would display a larger variance in equilibrium. In the spirit of the robust analysis, we began
without any assumptions on the nature of the private information that the agents may have when they
make their decisions. But in many circumstances, there may be prior knowledge about the nature of the
private information of the agents. In particular, we may able to impose a lower bound on the private
information that the agents may have. We can then ask how the prediction of the equilibrium behavior
can be rened in the presence of prior restrictions on the private information of the agents.
Given the su¢ ciency of a bivariate information structure to support the entire equilibrium set, we
present the lower bounds on the private information here in terms of a private and a public information
source, each one given in terms of a normally distributed noisy signal. We maintain the notation of Section
4 and denote the private signal that each agent i observes by xi =  + "i, and the public signal that all
agents observe by y =  + ", as dened earlier in (11) and (12), respectively.
The exogenous data on the payo¤ and belief environment of the game is now given by the multivariate
normal distribution of the triple (; xi; y). The information contained in the private signal xi and the public
signal y represent the lower bound on the private information of the agents. Correspondingly, we can dene
a Bayes correlated equilibrium with given private information as a joint distribution over the exogenous
data (; x; y) and the endogenous data (a;A). We use the symmetry and the relationship between the
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The newly appearing correlation coe¢ cients ax and ay represent the correlation between the individual
action and the random terms, "i and ", in the private and public signals, xi and y, respectively. We can
analyze the correlated equilibrium conditions as before. The best response function must satisfy:
a = rE [A ja; x; y ] + sE [ ja; x; y ] + u; 8a; x; y: (40)
In contrast to the analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium without prior information, the recommended
action now has to form a best response conditional on the recommendation a and the realization of the
private and public signals, xi and y, respectively. In particular, the conditional expectation induced jointly
by (a; x; y) has to vary at a specic rate with the realization of a; x; y so as to maintain the best response
property (40) for all realizations of a; x; y. The complete characterization of the set of Bayes correlated
equilibria with prior information requires the determination of a larger set of second moments, namely 
a; a; ax; ay; a

than in the earlier analysis. As we gather the equilibrium restrictions from (40), we
nd that we also have a corresponding increase in the number of equality constraints on the equilibrium
























Notably, the characterization of the standard deviation of the individual action has not changed relative
to the initial analysis. The novel restrictions on the correlation coe¢ cients ax and ay only involve r, but
the informational externality s does not appear.
Consequently, the relation between the correlation coe¢ cients ax and ay can be written, using the
conditions (41) as axx = ayy (1  r), where the factor 1  r corrects for the fact that the public signal
receives a di¤erent weight than the private signal due to the interaction structure.
The additional inequality restrictions arise as the variance-covariance matrix of the multivariate normal
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Thus the additional inequalities which completely describe the set of correlated equilibria are given by:
1  a   2ax  0; (42)
a   2a   2ay  0: (43)
We encountered the above inequalities before, see Proposition 5.3, but without the additional entries of
ax and ay. The rst inequality reects the equilibrium restriction between a and ax. As ax represents
the correlation between the individual action a and the idiosyncratic signal x, it imposes an upper bound
on the correlation coe¢ cient a among individual actions. If each of the individual actions are highly
correlated with their private signal, then the correlation of the individual actions cannot be too high in
equilibrium. Conversely, the second inequality states that either the correlation between individual action
and public signal, or individual action and state of the world naturally force an increase in the correlation
across individual actions. The correlation coe¢ cients a and ay therefore impose a lower bound on the
correlation coe¢ cient a.
The equilibrium restrictions imposed by the private and public signal are separable. We can hence
combine (41) with (42), or with (43), respectively, to analyze how the private or the public signal restrict
the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. Given that the mean action is constant across the Bayes correlated
equilibria and that the variance 2a of the action is determined by the correlation coe¢ cients (a; a), see
(41), we can describe the set of Bayes correlated equilibria exclusively in terms of correlation coe¢ cients
(a; a).
We dene the set of all Bayes correlated equilibria which are consistent with prior private information
x as the private equilibrium set Cx (x; r):
Cx (x; r) , f(a; a) 2 [0; 1] [ 1; 1] j(a; a; ax) satisfy (19), (41), (42)g .
Similarly, we dene the set of all Bayes correlated equilibria which are consistent with prior public infor-
mation y as the public equilibrium set Cy (y; r):
Cy (y; r) ,

(a; a) 2 [0; 1] [ 1; 1]
 a; a; ay satisfy (19), (41), (43)	 .
The intersection of the private and the public equilibrium sets denes the Bayes correlated equilibria
consistent with the prior information (x; y):
C ((x; y) ; r) , Cx (x; r) \ Cy (y; r)  [0; 1] [ 1; 1] .
The shape of the Bayes correlated equilibrium set is illustrated in Figure 4. Each forward bending curve















Figure 4: Set of BCE with given public and private information
bound on the precision x of the private information. Similarly, each backward bending curve traces out
the set of correlation coe¢ cients (a; a) which solve (41) and (43) as an equality, given a lower bound on
the precision y of the public information. A lens formed by the intersection of a forward and a backward
bending curve represents the Bayes correlated equilibria consistent with a lower bound on the precision of
the private and the public signal.
As suggested by the behavior of the equilibrium set, any additional correlation device cannot undo the
given private and public information, but rather provides additional correlation opportunities over and
above those contained in (x; y).
Proposition 8 (Prior Information)
For all r 2 ( 1; 1) :
1. The equilibrium set C ((x; y) ; r) is decreasing in (x; y) ;
2. The lowest correlation coe¢ cient (a; ) 2 C ((x; y) ; r), is increasing in (x; y);
3. The lowest correlation coe¢ cient (a; ) 2 C ((x; y) ; r), is increasing in (x; y).
Thus, as the precision of the prior information increases, the set of Bayes correlated equilibria shrinks.
As the precision of the signal increases, the equilibrium set, as represented by the correlation coe¢ cients
becomes smaller. In particular, the lowest possible correlation coe¢ cients of a and a that may emerge
in any Bayes correlated equilibrium increase as the given precision of private information increases.
As the preceding discussion suggests, we can relate the set of Bayes correlated equilibria under the prior
information with a corresponding set of Bayes Nash equilibria. If the correlated equilibrium contains no
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additional information in the conditioning through the recommended action a over and above the private
and public signal, x and y, then the correlated equilibrium is simply equal to the Bayes Nash equilibrium
with the specic information structure (x; y). This suggests that we identify the unique Bayes Nash
equilibrium with information structure (x; y) and interaction term r in terms of the correlation coe¢ cients
(a; a) as B ((x; y) ; r)  [0; 1] [ 1; 1].
Corollary 3 (BCE and BNE with Prior Information)
For all (x; y), we have:









In Section 5.4, we extended the analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium from an environment with
pure common values to an environment with interdependent values. Similarly, we could extend the analysis
of the prior information, pursued here in some detail for the environment with pure common values to the
one with interdependent values.
7 Information Sharing and Information Structure
We are often interested in analyzing what is the best information structure in a strategic setting, either for
the players in the game or for an outside observer who cares about choices in the game. For example, recent
work by Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) have considered this problem in the
context of single person games, i.e., decision problems; Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) characterizes the
revenue-maximizing information structure in an auction with many bidders; and a large literature reviewed
below has examined the incentives of competing rms to share cost and demand information. Directly
maximizing over all possible information structures, especially with many players, sounds intractable. Our
compact representation of the Bayes correlated equilibria allows us to assess the private and/or social
welfare across the entire set of possible information structures (and induced equilibrium distributions). In
this section, we show how results developed in earlier sections allows us to easily do this and deliver novel
economic insights. In particular, we identify settings where the information structure that turns out to be
optimal was excluded from the parametric domain of information structures analyzed in earlier work. In
the context of the application of information sharing among rms, we show that it is optimal to have rms
transmit all information that they have, but have that information observed with noise by other rms.
The problem of information sharing among rms was pioneered in work by Novshek and Sonnenschein
(1982), Clarke (1983) and Vives (1984), who examined to what extent competing rms have an incentive
to share information in an uncertain environment. In this strand of literature, which is surveyed in Vives
32
(1990) and embedded in a very general framework by Raith (1996), each rm receives a private signal
about a source of uncertainty, say a demand or cost shock. The central question then is under which
conditions the rms have an incentive to commit ex-ante to an agreement to share information in some
form. A striking result by Clarke (1983) was the nding that in a Cournot oligopoly with uncertainty
about a common parameter of demand, the rms will never nd it optimally to share information. The
complete lack of information sharing, independent of the precision of the private signal and the number
of competing rms, is surprising. After all, it would be socially optimal to reduce the uncertainty about
demand and a reasonable conjecture would be that the rms could at least partially appropriate the social
gains of information. The result of Clarke (1983) appeared in the context of a linear inverse demand with
normally distributed uncertainty, and a constant marginal cost. In subsequent work, the strong result
of zero information sharing was shown to rely on constant marginal cost, and with a quadratic cost of
production, it was shown that either zero or complete information sharing can be optimal, where the
information sharing result appears when the cost of production is su¢ ciently convex for each rm, and
hence information becomes more valuable, see Kirby (1988) and Raith (1996).
In the above cited work, the individual rms receive a private, idiosyncratic and noisy signal xi about
the state of demand . Each rm can commit to transmit the information, noisy or noiseless, to an inter-
mediary, such as a trade association, which aggregates the information. The intermediary then discloses
the aggregate information to the rms. Importantly, while the literature did consider the possibility of
noisy or noiseless transmission of the private information, it a priori restricted the disclosure policy to be
noiseless, which implicitly restrict the information policy to disclose the same, common signal to all the
rms. An information policy is then a pair a information transmission and information disclosure poli-
cies. The present analysis of the Bayes correlated equilibrium allows us to substantially modify the earlier
insights. Interestingly, Proposition 9 establishes that it is with substantial loss in generality to restrict
attention to a common disclosure policy.
We described the payo¤s of the quantity setting rms with uncertainty about demand in Example
2, where s > 0 represents the positive informational e¤ect of a higher state  of demand and r < 0
represents the fact the rms are producing (homogeneous) substitutes. An increase in the absolute value
of the (negative) interaction parameter r then represents an increase in the slope the demand curve. We
rst ask what information structure maximizes rmsprots, by nding the rm optimal Bayes correlated
equilibrium. We will then consider how to attain that information structure through information sharing.
Correlation of output with demand (a) increases prots but correlation between rmsoutput (a)
decreases prot. Thus it is always optimal to set a as high as possible consistent with BCE, and thus
a =
p
a. If the demand curve is su¢ ciently steep, it is optimal to have complete information but
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otherwise there is an interior solution.
Proposition 9 (Information Sharing and Prot)
1. If r   1, then the rm optimal BCE is achieved at a = a = 1.




< 1 and a =
p
a < 1. (44)
We can now translate the structure of the prot maximizing Bayes correlated equilibrium into the
corresponding Bayes Nash equilibrium and its associated information policy and information structure.
Suppose that each of the continuum of rms receives only a private signal xi with variance 2. We
characterized in Section 6 the set of Bayes correlated equilibria consistent with prior private information
of a certain precision. If there is one corresponding to the rm optimal BCE, then we can identify an
information sharing technology that will attain the rst best. If not, we can identify the rm second best
BCE and how that can be achieved.
If all information is publicly shared, then we reach the complete information equilibrium with a =
a = 1. The rst part of Proposition implies that full public disclosure is the optimal information policy if
the slope of the demand curve is su¢ ciently low. But the second part of the Proposition indicates that the
optimal disclosure policy may require noisy and idiosyncratic disclosure of the transmitted information,
rather than noiseless disclosure as previously analyzed in the literature. In fact, if slope of the demand
curve is su¢ ciently large, then the prot maximizing Bayes correlated equilibrium arises under the cor-
relation coe¢ cient of the actions, a = 
2
a =  1r < 1. As we learned from Proposition 6, these are the
correlation coe¢ cients which maximizes the variance of the individual action, i.e. the individual supply
decisions. Now if private signals were su¢ ciently accurate, a would already be too high even without any
information transmission. But if private signals were not too accurate, then it will be possible to attain
the rm optimal BCE. From Proposition 5, we know that a = 
2
a is at the boundary of the set of Bayes
correlated equilibrium and that the boundary can only be reached with idiosyncratic information, i.e. in-
formation which is conditionally on state  independent across agents. Thus the optimal disclosure policy
requires noisy and idiosyncratic disclosure of the transmitted information, rather than noiseless disclosure
as previously assumed in the literature.
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Proposition 10 (Noisy and Idiosyncratic Disclosure Policy )
1. If r   1, then full disclosure is rm optimal.
2. If r <  1 and








, then the rm optimal disclosure policy is to have each rm observe a
noisy signal of the average of their private signals (which equals the true state).








, then no disclosure is rm optimal.
The sharing of the private information impacts the prot of the rms through two channels. First,
shared information about level of demand improves the supply decision of the rms, and unambiguously
increases the prots. Second, shared information increases the correlation in the strategies of the actions.
In an environment with strategic substitutes, this second aspect is undesirable from the point of view
of each individual rm. Now, the literature only considered noiseless disclosure. In the context of our
analysis, this represents a public signal; after all a noiseless disclosure means that all the rms receive the
same information. Thus, the choice of the optimal disclosure regime can be interpreted as the choice of
the precision y of the public signal, and hence a point along a level curve for a given x, see Figure 4.
But now we realize that the disclosure in form of a public signal requires a particular trade-o¤ between
the correlation coe¢ cient a across actions and the correlation a of action and state. In particular,
an increase in the correlation coe¢ cient a is achieved only at the cost of substantially increasing the
undesirable correlation across actions. This trade-o¤, necessitated by the public information disclosure,
meant that the optimal disclosure is either to not disclose any information or disclose all information. The
present analysis suggests a more subtle result which is to disclose some information, so that the private
information of all the rms is improved, but to do so in way that does not increase the correlation across
actions more than necessary. This is achieved by an idiosyncratic, that is private and noisy disclosure
policy, which necessarily does not reveal all the private information of the agents, as they would otherwise
achieve complete correlation in their action.
The very last result of Proposition 10 rea¢ rms the earlier result of Clarke (1983), which presented
conditions under which zero information transmission was optimal. The necessary and su¢ cient condition











is best understood in light of the role of the prior information. We established in Proposition 8 that the
lowest correlation coe¢ cient is increasing in the precision of the prior information x and y. Now, if the
precision of the public signal is zero or y = 0, then the correlation coe¢ cient induced by the private signal
35
with precision x =  2x is given by the right hand side of (45). In other words, if the prot maximizing
level of correlation a, is below the level already induced by the prior information x, then, but only then,
do the rms prefer zero information transmission and disclosure. We should mention that in contrast to
the literature, we present and establish the above results, in line with rest of the present analysis, for
the environment with a continuum of rms. However, the results carry over to the environment with a
nite number of rms as the only relevant determinant is the structure of the best response as discussed
in Section 3. The only modication that arises in the analysis with nite number of rms is the extent of
the correlation a with respect to the state . If there are only a nite number of rms, and hence only
a nite number of signals about the true state of the world, then even complete sharing of the available
information will not allow the rms to achieve a = 1, even though their actions will be completely
correlated or a = 1. The nite information then acts as a constraint on the amount of information shared,
but does not a¤ect the preference for or against information sharing.
8 Robust Identication
So far, our analysis has been concerned with the predictive implications of Bayes correlated and Bayes
Nash equilibrium. In particular, we have been asking what are the restrictions imposed by the structural
model on the observed endogenous statistics about the actions of the agents. In this section we pursue
the converse question, namely the issue of identication. We ask what restrictions can be imposed on
the parameters of interest, the structural parameters of the game (r; s; u), by the observed variables? We
are particularly interested in how the identication of the structural parameters (r; s; u) is inuenced by
the solution concept, and hence the specication of the private information of the agents as known to the
analyst.
Now, identication depends critically on what types of data are available. Here, we consider the
possibility of identication with individual data and assume that the econometrician observes the realized
individual actions ai and the realized state .3 In other words, the econometrician learns the rst and
second moment of the joint equilibrium distribution over actions and state: (a; a; a; ; a). We begin
the identication analysis under the hypothesis of Bayes Nash equilibrium and a given information structure
(x; y) of the agents.
3 In Bergemann and Morris (2011b), we also analyze the robust identication with aggregate data. As a leading example we
consider the canonical problem of demand and supply identication. The identication in the linear demand and supply model
relies on the aggregate data, namely market quantity and market price. In contrast to the received work on identication in
the demand and supply model we allow for incomplete information by the market participants about the cost and demand
factors.
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For a given information structure (x; y) and observed moments of the Bayes Nash equilibrium distri-
bution, (a; a; a; ; a), we can identify the weights on the private signal and the public signal, 

x and
y, directly from the variance of the (aggregate) action and the covariance of the (aggregate) action with
the state, see (18). Now, we can use the property of the equilibrium strategy, namely that the ratio of the








Thus given the knowledge of the information structure, we can infer the sign of the strategic interaction
term r from the ratio of the linear weights, x and 

y. In particular, we can determine how much of
the variance in the action, individual or aggregate, is attributable to the private and the public signal
respectively. Given the known strength of the signals, the covariance of the action and the state then
allow us to identify the slope of the equilibrium response. We thus nd that the parameters of equilibrium
response and the sign of the interaction parameters are identied for every known information structure
of the game.
Proposition 11 (Point Identication in BNE)
The Bayes Nash equilibrium outcomes with information structure (x; y),
1. identies the informational externality s;
2. identies the strategic interaction r if 0 < x; y <1; and
3. identies the equilibrium slope and equilibrium intercept, the ratios s= (1  r) and u= (1  r).
We contrast the point identication for any specic information structure with the set identication
in the Bayes correlated equilibrium. We do not make a specic hypothesis regarding the information
structure of the agents, and ask what we learn from the data in the absence of specic knowledge of the
information structure. Now, from the observation of the covariance aa and the observation of the
aggregate variance a
2
a, we can identify the values of a and a. The equilibrium conditions which tie
the data to the structural parameters are given by the following conditions on mean and variance:
a =
u+ s




We thus have two restrictions to identify the three unknown structural parameters (r; s; u). We can solve
for two of the unknowns in terms of the remaining unknowns. In particular, when we solve for (s; u) in
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terms of the remaining unknown r, we obtain expressions for the equilibrium intercept and the equilibrium
slope in terms of the moments and the remaining unknown structural parameters:
u
1  r = a  
a (1  ar)







1  r : (47)
Now, except for the case of a = 1, in which the actions of the agents are perfectly correlated, we nd that
the ratio on the left hand side is not uniquely determined. As the strategic interaction parameter r can















if a < 0;
(48)









if a > 0;
 1; aaa

if a < 0:
(49)
which describes the respective sets into which each ratio can be identied.
Proposition 12 (Set Identication in BCE)
The Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes:
1. identify the sign of the informational externality s;
2. do not identify the sign of the strategic interaction r;
3. identify a set of equilibrium slopes, given by (49), if a < 1.
Thus, in comparison to the Bayes Nash equilibrium, the Bayes correlated equilibrium, weakens the
possibility of identication in two respects. First, we fail to identify the sign of the strategic interaction
r; second, we can identify only a set of possible interaction ratios. Given the sharp di¤erences in the
identication under Bayes Nash and Bayes correlated equilibrium, we now try to provide some intuition as
to the source of the contrasting results. In the identication under the hypothesis of the Bayes correlated
equilibrium, the econometrician observes and uses the same data as under the Bayes Nash equilibrium, but
does not know anymore how precise or noisy the information of the agents is. Thus, the econometrician
now face an attribution problem as the observed covariance between the action and the state could be large
either because the individual preferences are very responsive to the state, i.e. s is large, or because the
agents have very precise information about the state and hence respond strongly to the precise information,
even though they are only moderately sensitive to the state, i.e. s is low.
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This attribution problem, which is present when the agents information structure is not known, is
often referred to as attenuation biasin the context of individual decision making. The basic question is
how much we can learn from the observed data when the analyst cannot be certain about the information
that the agent has when he chooses his action. In the single agent context, the noisy signal x that
the agent receives about the state of world  leads to noise in the predictor variable. The noise in the
predictor variable introduces a bias, the attenuation bias. Yet in the single agent model, the sign
of the parameter of interest, the informational externality s remains correctly identied, even though the
information externality is set-identied rather than point-identied. Importantly, as we extend the analysis
to strategic interaction, the attenuation bias critically a¤ects the ability to identify the nature of the
strategic interaction. In particular, the set-identied information externality coversthe size of strategic
externality to the extent that we may not even identify the sign of the strategic interaction, i.e. whether
the agents are playing a game of strategic substitutes or complements.
Given the lack of identication in the absence of knowledge regarding the information structure, it
is natural to ask whether prior information can improve the identication of the structural parameters,
just as prior information could improve the equilibrium prediction. In Section 6, we showed that the
knowledge of the information structure (x; y) systematically restricts the equilibrium predictions of the
coe¢ cients (a; a). Now, as we consider the identication of the structural parameters, we might use
the knowledge of the information structure (x; y) together with the data to restrict the set of structural
parameters consistent with the data and the prior information (x; y). In the working paper, Bergemann
and Morris (2011b), we formally analyze how the set of possible equilibrium coe¢ cients (a; a) depends
on the prior information (x; y) and the interaction parameter r. This, then allows us ask which values of
the interaction parameter r are consistent with the observed data, in particular the equilibrium correlation
coe¢ cients (a; a). We show that the set-identication improves with an increase in the precision of the
prior information and converges to point-identication as the precision of the prior information becomes
arbitrarily large.
We should emphasize that the current payo¤ environment describes a common value environment, i.e.
the state of the world is the same for all the agents. In contrast, much of the small, but growing literature on
identication in games with incomplete information is concerned with a private value environment, in which
the private information of agent i only a¤ects the utility of agent i, as for example in Sweeting (2009), Bajari,
Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010) or Paula and Tang (2011). A second important distinction is that in
the above mentioned papers, the identication is about some partial aspect of the utility functions and the
distribution of the (idiosyncratic) states of the world, whereas the present identication seeks to identify
the entire utility function but assumes that the states of the world are observed by the econometrician.
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An interesting extension in the present setting would be to limit the identication to a certain subset of
parameters, say the interaction term r, but then identify the distribution of the states of the world rather
than assuming the observability of the states. For example, Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010)
estimate the peer e¤ect in the recommendation of stocks among stock market analysts in a private value
environment. There, the observables are the recommendations of the stock analysts and analyst specic
information about the relationship of the analyst to the recommended rm. The present analysis suggest
that a similar exercises could be pursued in a common value environment, much like a beauty contest.
A natural extension here would be use of the actual performance of the recommended stocks to in fact
identify the information structure of the stock analysts.
Finally, in many of the recent contributions the assumption of conditional independence of the private
information, relative to the public observables, is maintained. For example, in Paula and Tang (2011), the
conditional independence assumption is used to characterize the joint action equilibrium distribution in
terms of the marginal probabilities of every action. Paula and Tang (2011) uses the idea that if private
signals are i.i.d. across individuals, then the players actions must be independent in a single equilibrium,
but correlated when there are multiple equilibriato provide a test for multiple equilibria. In contrast, in
our model, we have uniqueness of the Bayes Nash equilibrium, but the unobserved information structure
of the agents could lead to correlation, which would then be interpreted in the above test as evidence
of multiple equilibria, but could simply be due to the unobserved correlation rather than multiplicity of
equilibria.
9 Conclusion
It was the objective of this paper to derive robust equilibrium predictions for a large class of games. We
began with an epistemic result that related the class of Bayes Nash equilibria with the class of Bayes
correlated equilibria. The equivalence results allowed us to focus on the characterization of the Bayes
correlated equilibria which proceeded without reference to a specic information structure held by the
agents. Within a class of quadratic payo¤ environments, we gave a full characterization of the equilibria
in terms of moment restrictions on the equilibrium distributions. The robust analysis allowed us to make
equilibrium predictions independent of the information structure, the nature of the private information
that the agents might have access to.
We then reversed the point of view and considered the problem of identication rather than the problem
of prediction. We asked what are the implication of a robust point of view for identication, namely the
ability to infer the unobservable structural parameters of the game from the observable data. Here we
showed that in the presence of robustness concerns, the ability to identify the underlying parameters of the
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game is weakened in important ways, yet does not completely eliminate the possibility of identication. The
current perspective, namely to analyze the set of correlated equilibria rather than the Bayes Nash equilibria
under a specic information structure, is potentially useful in the emerging econometric analysis of games
of incomplete information. There the identication question is typically pursued for a given information
structure, say independently distributed payo¤ types, and it is of interest to know how sensitive the
identication results are to the structure of the private information. In this context, the robust identication
might be particularly important as we rarely observe data about the nature of the information structure
directly.
In the present analysis, we use the structure of the quadratic payo¤s, in particular the linear best
response property to derive the rst and second moments of the correlated equilibrium set. A natural
next step would be to bring the present analysis to Bayesian games with discontinuous payo¤s. For
example, it would be of considerable interest to ask how the allocations and the revenues di¤er across
belief environments and auction formats. In ongoing work Bergeman, Brooks, and Morris (2011) consider
a private value environment in rst price auction format. Abraham, Athey, Babaio¤, and Grubb (2011)
trace the implications of di¤erent information structures in a common value environment in a second price
auction format.
Finally, we could use the equilibrium predictions to o¤er robust versions of policy and welfare analysis.
In many incomplete information environments, a second best or otherwise welfare improving policy typically
relies on and is sensitive to the specication of the belief environment. With the current analysis, we might
be able to recommend robust taxation or information disclosure policies which are welfare improving across
a wide range of belief environments. In particular, we might ask how the nature of the policy depends on
the prior information of the policy maker about the belief environment of the agents.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that  is a BCE of (u;  ). Let T = R, let  :  ! (T ) be set
equal to the conditional probability  :  ! (R) and let  be the "truth-telling" strategy with type a
choosing action a with probability 1. Now
E[ (ja)u
 
a0; g  ; 

= Eb(ja)u  a0; h; 
by construction and the BCE equilibrium conditions imply the BNE equilibrium conditions.
Suppose that  is a BNE of ((u;  ) ; (T; )) and so
E[ (jt)u (a; g  ; )  E[ (jt)u
 
a0; g  ; 

(50)
for all t 2 T , a in the support of  ( jt) and a0 2 R. Now E[ (jt)u (a
0; g  ; ) is a function of t. The
expectation of this expectation conditional on a being drawn under strategy  is
E\ (ja)u
 
a0; g  ; 

and thus taking the expectation of both sides of (50) establishes that      is a BCE.
Proof of Proposition 4. The correlation coe¢ cients a and a of the Bayes Nash equilibrium can


































 (x + y)
2 . (52)
It now follows immediately from (51) - (52), and the formulae of x and 

y, see (14), that we can recover
the corresponding information structure (x; y) of the Bayes Nash equilibrium as
x =
 








(1  ar)  2a (1  r)

q
a   2a jaj (1  r)
;
which completes the proof.







, which is maximized at jaj =
p
 1=r, or a =  1=r.
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(1 + ar) ,
where the later is positive if and only if








(2.) The dispersion, using (33), is given by:






and it follows that the dispersion is increasing in jaj. The dispersion is monotone decreasing in a if it is
game of strategic substitutes, and not necessarily monotone if it is a game of strategic complements. The






2 (1  r   (1  a) r)
(1  ar)3
.
However by Proposition 5, it follows that 2a  a, and we therefore obtain the maximal dispersion at
2a = a. Consequently, we have






and the dispersion reaches an interior maximum at a = 1= (2  r) 2 (0; 1), irrespective of the nature of
the game.
Proof of Proposition 8. We form the conditional expectation using (39) and the equilibrium
conditions for the Bayes correlated equilibrium are then given by (40) and the solution to these equations
is given by (41).
(1.) The equilibrium set is described as the set which satises the inequalities (42) and (43), where the
correlation coe¢ cients 2ax and 
2
ay appear separately. By determination of (41), the square of the corre-
lation coe¢ cient is strictly decreasing in x and y, which directly implies that the respective inequalities
become less restrictive, and hence the equilibrium set increases as either x or y increases.
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(2.) The lowest value of the correlation coe¢ cient a is achieved when the inequalities (42) and (43)
are met as equalities. It follows that the minimum is reached at the exterior of the equilibrium set. The
equilibrium set is increasing in  by the previous argument in (1), and hence the resulting strict inequality.
(3.) The lowest value of the correlation coe¢ cient a is achieved when the inequality (43) is met as an
equality. It follows that the minimum is reached at the exterior of the equilibrium set. The equilibrium
set is increasing in  by the previous argument in (1), and hence the resulting strict inequality.
Proof of Proposition 9. The ex post prot of the rm is given by:
(s + rA) a+ ua  1
2
a2;
and the interim expected prot is the above expectation and consists of terms that depend on the means





















The remaining restriction of the Bayes correlated equilibrium, see Proposition 5, is that 2a  a, and





i.e., it is always optimal to set the correlation coe¢ cient a so that 
2
a = a. The relevant rst order
condition w.r.t. to a is given by:
2s
2 (1 + ar)
(1  ar)3
= 0.
It follows that if r >  1, then there is no interior solution and the prot maximizing BCE is given by





The validity of the second order conditions can be veried easily.
Proof of Proposition 10. By Proposition 9, if r   1, then the prot maximizing equilibrium
allocation requires a = a = 1. Now, the Bayes Nash equilibrium associated with this correlation
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structure requires that the agents have complete information about , but clearly with a large number
of rms, here a continuum, this can be achieved by completely disclosing the private information of each
individual rm (provided that 2x <1).
On the other hand, if r <  1, then the interior solution requires that a < 1 and 2a = a. By
Proposition 2, we know that such a correlation structure can be achieved in the Bayes Nash equilibrium if
and only if the agents make decisions on the basis of a private signal only, i.e. the variance of the public
signal is required to be innite. This in turn can be achieved if each agent receives information about the
true state with an idiosyncratic noise, and hence with a private signal, which necessitates idiosyncratic and
noisy information disclosure. Finally, given the initial private information of the agents, represented by 2x,
we only need to complement the initial information if it does not already achieve or exceed a =  1=r. From
(17), we nd that the correlation coe¢ cient in the Bayes Nash equilibrium without additional information








, which establishes the critical value for information sharing.




y and the information about the
covariates, we can recover the value of the linear coe¢ cients 2x and 
2












The value of covariate AA, given by 
2
 (x + y) directly identies the sign of the externality s, given
the composition of the equilibrium coe¢ cients x and 

y of the Bayes Nash equilibrium, see (14).
(2.) We have from the description of the Bayes Nash equilibrium in Proposition 2 that in every Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, x and 









Now, if 0 < 2x; 
2
y <1, then we can identify r.
(3.) Given the identication of x and 

y, we can identify the ratios u= (1  r) and s= (1  r). We




y, from the equilibrium
data. From the equilibrium conditions, see (14), we have the values of a; x and y. This allows us to




















If we form the ratios u= (1  r) and s= (1  r) with the expressions on the rhs of (55), then we obtain
expressions which do only depend on the observable data, and are hence point identied, and in particular
u
1  r =  








x   y2y + y2x2y
2x
; (57)
which completes the proof of identication. We observe that, using (54), we could express the ratios (56)
and (57) entirely in terms of the rst two moments of observed data.
Proof of Proposition 12. (1.) From the observation of the covariance aa we can infer the sign
and the size of a, see (46). Given the information on left hand side and the information of a, we can
infer the sign of s.
(2.) Even though the sign of s can be established, we cannot extract the unknown variables on the rhs
of (46) in the presence of the linear return term u, and hence it follows that we cannot sign r.
(3.) From the observation of the covariance aa and the observation of the aggregate variance
a
2
a, we can infer the value of a and a. The equilibrium conditions then impose the conditions on mean
and variance, see (46). We thus have two equations to identify the three unknown structural parameters
(r; s; u). We can solve for (s; u) in terms of the remaining unknown r to obtain:
u =






In particular, we would like to know whether this allows us to identify the ratios:
u
1  r =  a +
a (1  ar)
 (1  r) a
;
s





in terms of the observables. But, except for the case of a = 1, we see that this is not the case. As
r 2 ( 1; 1), it follows that we can only partially identify the above ratios, namely (48) and (49) which
describe the respective sets into which each ratio can be identied.
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